Following the
Spanish navy’s loss at the Battle of Manila Bay /
Cavite in the Philippines, major
elements of the Spanish Home Fleet under Admiral Camara
were ordered to the Philippines. Tactics by the U.S. and Great Britain
delayed
the squadron’s passage through the Suez Canal. U.S threats to the
Spanish
homeland and the losses suffered at the Battle
of Santiago forced the squadron
to return to Spanish waters.
The Spanish American War in Egyptian Waters
Following Spain’s loss
of its Philippine naval squadron at
the Battle
of Manila Bay / Cavite, in the Philippines, Governor-General Basilio
Augustin y Davila communicated with his government in Madrid requesting
reinforcement, particularly warships, to defeat Rear
Admiral George Dewey’s
Asiatic Squadron. Spain responded by ordering a sizeable squadron to
the Philippines.
Included in this squadron, to be commanded by sixty-three-year-old
Admiral Manuel de la Camara y Libermoore, was the battleship PELAYO and armored
cruiser CARLOS V, the most powerful ships in
the Spanish navy. Camara’s orders
were:
“To
avoid manifestly unfavorable encounters,
considering as an essential point to avoid the useless sacrifice of the
squadron and always to leave the honor of the troops without injury.”
These orders were
rather different from those given Admiral
Pascual
Cervera, whose squadron was sent to Cuba.
By Cervera’s his own admission in
advance of its deployment that his squadron was being sent to its death.
PELAYO
was the most formidable ship in the Spanish Navy.
Displacing nearly 10,000 tons, almost twice that of Dewey’s OLYMPIA,
she
represented quite a threat to Dewey’s plucky squadron. Her two 320 mm
guns
(12.6 in.) and two 280 mm (11 in.) outsized OLYMPIA’s
8” guns considerably,
which were the largest guns in Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron. The CARLOS V was also
significant, displacing over 9,000 tons and armed with two 280 mm (11
in.) guns.
At the outbreak of the
war, the PELAYO was undergoing a
refit, and when she departed with Camara she was without the armor
protection
for her secondary battery. The CARLOS V was
brand new and not yet operational
when the war broke out. This was her first major assignment.
Joining these two
vessels were a collection of other ships,
including the Auxiliary Cruisers PATRIOTA
and RAPIDO, the protected cruiser
ALFONSO XIII, torpedoboat destroyers
AUDAZ, OSADO, and PROSERPINA; transports PANAY
and BUENOS AIRES, and four colliers with twenty thousand ton of coal.
The ALFONSO XIII was quickly dropped
from the squadron when it was found to be
unfinished. The torpedoboat destroyers were intended to be with the
squadron
only as far as Port Said at the entrance to Suez Canal.
The squadron sortied
from Cadiz on June 16, 1898. As many of
the ships had fouled hulls – hulls with a growth of barnacles, seaweed,
etc.,
their coal consumption would be higher than normal and their speed
slower, both
critical issues.
The squadron consisted
of the following:
PELAYO – 9745 tons, main battery of two 12.6 in
(320 mm) guns,
two 11 in. (280 mm) guns, one 6.4 in. (162 mm) gun.
CARLOS V – 9235 tons, main battery of two 11
in. (280 mm)
guns, eight 5.5 in. (140 mm) guns.
PATRIOTA – The former Hamburg-America Lines
liner NORMANIA,
10,500 tons and armed with 4.7 in (120 mm) guns
RAPIDO - the former
Hamburg-America Lines liner COLUMBIA, 9500 tons and armed with 6.3 (162
mm) and
5.5 in. (140 mm) guns
PANAY
(transport)
BUENOS
AIRES (transport) (with the transports carrying 4,000
troops)
Four
colliers
As the ships left the
Atlantic and passed through the Strait
of Gibraltar, the movement was reported to the U.S. government. Efforts
had to
be made to stop or slow Camara’s squadron to allow for Rear Admiral George Dewey in
the Philippines
to develop alternate plans for the defense of his Asiatic Squadron.
On receiving the data,
the U.S. Navy took action and
dispatched the monitors MONTEREY and
MONADANOCK to Manila. However, the two
vessels would have to be towed across the treacherous Pacific Ocean.
This was a
particular concern since the monitors had very low freeboard and low
reserve buoyancy,
issues typical of this class of warship – in short, they could sink
much more
easily than a typical warship, and the vast Pacific Ocean could be
unforgiving.
As for Dewey’s options, they were limited since the
Spanish
squadron simply would have him outgunned and outranged. The odds were
somewhat altered
in that target practice training was at a higher level aboard the
American
ships, whereas on the Spanish navy’s budgetary constraints limited
target practice.
If Dewey simply decided to fight it out with
the Spanish squadron, an American
victory would still be unlikely. Alternately, Dewey
could take the squadron
into hiding in a remote bay and wait reinforcements and a chance to
attack the
Spanish ships piecemeal. Dewey could also take
his squadron east and meet the MONTEREY,
the monitor expected to arrive earliest, and then move against the
Spanish, but, in spite of the MONTEREY’s
two 12 inch guns and two 10 inch guns,
the Asiatic Squadron would still be outgunned. He could plant his
squadron in
front of Manila where the guns from the city could reinforce the
squadron, an
action also considered by the Spanish Admiral
Montojo before the Battle of
Manila Bay. Montojo had rejected the
idea so as to avoid loss of life in the
city. None of these options were good. Without more firepower, Dewey’s
situation was untenable.
The U.S. and Great
Britain – the latter looking out for its
own interests by supporting the U.S. – independently got to work to
slow
Camara’s squadron’s progress towards the Philippines.
The Spanish squadron
headed east across the Mediterranean and would have to pass through the
Suez
Canal. Knowing that the lifeblood of the warship was coal and that,
since only
one warship would be allowed to traverse the Canal at a time – a
fifteen to
twenty hour journey – Camara probably planned to recoal at Port Said at
the
entrance to the canal. Both the U.S. and Great Britain took advantage
of this
situation. The deputy U.S. consul general, Ethelbert Watt, purchased
all
available coal supplies, including coal for which Spain had issued
contracts
but for which it had not yet paid. The U.S. took the initiative to buy
up all available
coal along the remainder of the route to the Philippines.
Camara had four
colliers, and could live off of the coal contained in them for some
time if
needed, but a threat to Spanish squadron’s coal supply could not be
taken
lightly. Given the fouled hulls of some of the Spanish ships, and the
inability
to recoal enroute to the Philippines, coal supplies could be an issue
in the
long term for the Spanish as they advanced on the Philippines.
Great Britain, which
controlled the Egyptian government, caused
Egypt to stringently enforce the twenty-four hour limit on how much
time the
Spanish ships could stay at Port Said according to neutrality laws.
Great
Britain also had Egypt inform Camara that the Spanish vessels, as a
nation at
war, could not recoal even from its own colliers in Egyptian waters.
Again,
this just created more issues for Camara, but did not stop the
squadron’s move
east.
Camara’s squadron
slowly passed through the canal. As one ship
traversed the canal in fifteen to twenty hours, the completion of the
passage
was wired back to Port Said and the next warship began its journey
through the
canal. Finally, by July 5, the entire squadron was through the canal,
with the
exception of the AUDAZ, PROSPERTINA and OSADO, which Camara had decided
in
advance to leave behind, perhaps to save on coal.
Meanwhile, the U.S.
took more decisive action to the stop
the eastward movement of the squadron. On June 27 the U.S. Secretary of
the
Navy, John Long, ordered the formation of the “Eastern Squadron” to be
commanded by Commodore John Watson. Watson had commanded the Cuban
blockading
force up to that time. The Eastern Squadron, initially to consist of
the
battleships IOWA, and OREGON,
as well as the auxiliary cruisers YANKEE,
YOSEMITE and DIXIE, was to cross the
Atlantic and threaten the Spanish
homeland, the defenses of which were lowered by the departure of
Camara’s
squadron. At the same time that the orders were issued to form the
squadron,
the news was purposely leaked to Spain via William Sims, a naval
intelligence
officer stationed in Paris.
With the loss of Admiral Pascual
Cervera’s squadron at the Battle of Santiago on July 3, the need for
Camara’s squadron for the defense of the
Spanish homeland became all the more critical. Though Camara’s squadron
had
finally cleared the Suez Canal on July 5, on July 7 it received orders
to
return to Spain. The threat to Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron had be
averted.
The Eastern Squadron continued to exist on paper, though the ships
assigned to
it varied. Since Santiago, Cuba soon surrendered and negotiations for
an
armistice were soon underway, the Eastern Squadron was never physically
formed
as it was no longer needed.
With the return of Camara’s squadron to Spain, the Philippines would not be reinforced. The Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines, Basilio Augustin y Davila realized his predicament, and shortly entered into negotiations with Dewey regarding the surrender of Manila.
Nofi, Albert A., The Spanish-American War, 1898 . (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1996) 273, 282, 283, 310-311, 330.
Tucker, Spencer, “Camara y Libermoor, Manuel de la,” Encyclopedia of the Spanish American and Philippine American Wars. Vol 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009) 85.