[Confidential.]
HONORED SIR: His excellency
the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with the confidential letter
of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative to studies
made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful
examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has
suggested to me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit
to your excellency:
II we compare the Navy of
the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of
active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as published
in the December number of the Revista General de Marina and in our general
statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle
ships IOWA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, OREGON,
and TEXAS ; the armored cruisers BROOKLYN
and NEW YORK; the protected cruisers ATLANTA,
MINNEAPOLIS, BALTIMORE, CHARLESTON,
CHICAGO, CINCINNATI, COLUMBIA, NEWARK, SAN
FRANCISCO, OLYMPIA, PHILADELPHIA, AND RALEIGH,
and the rapid unprotected cruisers DETROIT, MARBLEHEAD, and MONTGOMERY. Against this we
have, following the same classification, the battleships PELAYO,
INFANTA MARIA TERESA, VIZCAYA,
and OQUENDO, armored cruiser COLÓN,
and protected cruisers CARLOS V, ALFONSO
XIII, and LEPANTO; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this,
supposing the PELAYO, CARLOS
V, and LEPANTO to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to
the ALFONSO XIII.
I do not mention the other
vessels on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that
of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still in
service, the ram KATAHDIN, the VESUVIUS, and
the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in
the present form the comparison is accurate enough. Comparing the
displacements, we find that in battle ships the United States has 41,589
tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons
against our 6,840; In protected cruisers, 51,098 against 18,887; and in
fast unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we have none.
The total vessels good for
all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against our 56,644 tons, or
something less than one-half. In speed our battleships are superior to
theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is
superior to ours. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is
possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the
respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87
inch are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the
calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84,7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24,
1.65, and 1.45 inches represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80,
41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1 which are the hundredths of the cubes of
the numbers representing their calibers expressed in inches
(Caliber in inches)3
100
Therefore, according to
these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the United States
vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a
little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling
conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the PELAYO and CARLOS V,
which probably will not be ready in time; the LEPANTO, which surely will
not be ready, and the ALFONSO XII, whose
speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.
Now, to carry out any
serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to
secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's
fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military
ports. Can we do this with the United States f It is evident to me that we
can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may
be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages
sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources?
I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this
departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may need,
it is to be assumed that the same condition exists every where,and that
the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the
enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the
campaign, whatever might be the result of that great con bat. In the
meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers,
aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.
This lack of industries and
stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive
campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his
excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough to send me. These two
reports constitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the
operations considered, but the principal foundation is lacking, namely,
the control of the sea, a prime necessity to their undertaking. For this
reason they do not seem practicable to me, at ant rate not unless we may
count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at least equal to
those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attainment
of such control.
If the control of the ser
remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make
themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in the
island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents ,and will use it
as a base of operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba
would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the
insurrection, without the check our army, which would gradually give way,
and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become
formidable.
These reflections are very
sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal
considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which
I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the
considerations for and against, and then, through the Government of His
Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its
decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic,
loyal, and decided executors, for we have but one motto: The fulfillment
of duty."
Yours, etc.,
PA8CUAL CERVERA,
CARTAGENA, February 25,
1898.
His Excellency the
MINISTER OF MARINE,
Excerpted from:
Cervera y. Topete, Admiral Pasqual, Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899. 56.